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Abstract 
Although consumer attitudes toward corporate social responsibility are positive, socially 
responsible (SR) products are far from gaining significant market shares. Information 
asymmetries have been identified as one of the factor contributing to this attitude-behaviour 
gap, because social responsibility is a credence attribute. Signalling may remedy this market 
failure. We use an experimental posted offer market to investigate the impact of various 
regulatory requirements for labels on sellers’ choice to supply SR products and to signal it, 
and on buyers’ choice of ethical quality. Three treatments are tested: label certification by a 
third-party, “cheap-talk signalling” with random monitoring and with or without reputations. 
Individual social preferences are elicited prior to the game, and their distribution generates a 
positive supply of and demand for social responsibility. When there is third-party certification 
or cheap-talk signalling with random monitoring and reputations, a separating equilibrium 
emerges, whereby labelled and non-labelled goods are exchanged at different prices. 
However, efficiency gains are significant only for third-party certification. Cheap-talk 
signalling with random monitoring but without reputations does not yield efficiency gains. 
Moreover, it generates a “halo” effect, whereby buyers are misguided by sellers’ claims about 
product quality. Finally, individual social preferences have a significant effect on players’ 
decisions. Only third-party certification can increase companies’ social responsibility and can 
allow consumers to express their social preferences through consumption. 
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1.  Introduction 
The European Commission defines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. In its view, CSR is a tool 
that would help reconcile economic, social and environmental ambition.
1 Opinion surveys 
reveal that there is a growing interest of consumers in the use of social-, environmental- and 
health-friendly technologies by companies Doane 2001. Many consumers express their 
concerns about the social responsibility of companies through the purchase of products 
certified as “fair”.
2 However, market share remain quite low – less than 1% for most fair-trade 
products in France
3 – which emphasizes the wide gap between consumer positive attitudes 
toward social responsibility and their actual behavior. From an economist point-of-view, two 
important barriers to ethical consumption are the price of products and the information 
asymmetry between sellers and consumers.
4 The social responsibility incorporated
5 in a 
product is a priori a credence attribute, as consumers cannot assess the characteristics of the 
production process without enduring important information costs Darby and Karni 1973; 
Nelson 1970. As a consequence, labels are often used to signal this aspect of products quality 
to consumers. Labels are a means of lowering the marginal information costs relatively to the 
marginal benefits of knowing that the product incorporates social responsibility Hirshleifer 
and Riley 1979. They transform credence attributes into search attributes that can be easily 
checked on point-of-purchases. However, labels do not reduce informational asymmetry if all 
producers can use them to claim that their production is socially responsible. This is the usual 
“lemon” problem Akerlof 1970. On the contrary, when labelling is costly and social 
responsibility is an important dimension of vertical differentiation between products, labels 
can signal correctly the quality of the product, i.e. they only convey substantiated claims. A 
separating equilibrium emerges, whereby those consumers with strong preferences for social 
responsibility will buy socially responsible, high-price, products, and those who pay little 
attention to social responsibility will buy the standard, low-price, products Rothschild and 
Stiglitz 1976; Spence 1973. 
This paper uses laboratory posted offer markets to analyses the impact of various 
regulatory requirements for labels on firms’ and consumers’ decisions. More specifically, we 
compare the relative impact of third-party certification and “cheap-talk signalling” with 
random monitoring and with or without reputations on the quality of products exchanged in 
the market, on prices, on sellers’ profits, and sellers’ and consumers’ production of social 
responsibility. Under third-party certification, an independent agency checks ex ante whether 
                                                 
1 The spectrum of activities covered by CSR is rather large, as social responsibility requires that attention be paid 
to many stakeholders beyond stock holders and consumers, in particular employees and suppliers, and be 
evaluated along dimensions such as human health, environment or local economic development. CSR has 
increasingly become an important concept in public policies, corporate communication and management 
sciences, perhaps because it is seen as a means of embedding moral values into market behaviors, and to achieve 
the sustainability of modern economies. 
2 In 2000, according to MORI, 66 per cent of European consumers declared that a CSR claim has triggered a 
purchase at least once (Hines and Ames 2000).  
3 A consumer survey reveals that in 2006, 21% of French were sure to have purchased a product with a social 
responsibility attribute over the last six months (Delpal and Hatchuel 2007). However, French consumers spent 
only 1.71 Euro per year on purchases of fair-trade products in 2005, as against 19.02 Euros for the Swiss or 4.62 
Euros for the British (Poret 2007).  
4 In addition, the full price of a purchase has two components at least, the market price and the cost of time spent 
at searching for the products. Regarding the latter, consumers often mention the lack of availability or visibility 
of socially responsible product in their supermarkets as an important obstacle to consumption.   
5 Such incorporation can be material as in aerosol products with no fluorocarbons, or just symbolic as in fair 
trade coffee. 3 
the firm complies with a minimum quality standard (e.g. no child labour, fair prices paid to 
farmers etc.) and the firm is allowed to signal the quality of its products through a label. 
Cheap-talk signalling means that firms can make unsubstantiated claims through uncertified 
labels or advertising. However, there is often a positive probability that such claims be 
detected by media, activists or consumer associations. This is modelled as an ex post 
probability of being detected as not complying with the minimum quality standard, and this 
information is posted to buyers before they make their choice. In a variant of this random 
monitoring treatment, we examine whether adding reputation to this random monitoring 
device change the results. One key difference with previous experimental designs is that we 
do not induce individual preferences over products quality and the monetary counterpart to 
the endogenous choice of quality takes the form of real donations to NGOs. Hence, 
participants do not only maximise payoffs, they also obtain utility from donations. As the 
existence of a sustainable demand for socially responsible products depends crucially on 
consumer preferences, not inducing the latter should produce more informative results for the 
regulation of real markets. Corporate social responsibility depends on consumer social 
responsibility. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The experimental design and 
procedures are presented in Section 2. Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.  Experimental design and procedures 
In each session, subjects play a modified dictator game, through which their social 
preferences in terms of altruism are elicited. Then, in the second part of the session, 
participants took part in a posted offer market game. 
2.1.A posted offer market game 
The trading institution is a variation of the posted offer market (Holt 2006; Plott and Smith 
1978). At each market period, eight sellers and twelve customers trade a virtual good. The 
number of sellers is high enough to induce a perfect or almost perfect Bertrand competition.
6 
The roles are randomly determined at the beginning of the market game and participants keep 
the same role during the whole experiment. The market game is repeated for 20 periods. Each 
period consists of three stages. In total, four treatments were organized. Each participant took 
part in only one treatment. We detail below each treatment. Subjects traded using 
Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which are converted for payments at the end of the 
experiment, at the rate of 8 ECU = 1 Euro. The conversion rate is known at the beginning of 
the experiment. 
In the control treatment (C treatment), each seller chooses a production cost, c, as well as a 
price, p. The production cost is, at minimum, 20 ECU per unit sold. The price must be higher 
than or equal to the production cost. Sellers can choose a production cost higher than 20 ECU. 
Then, for every unit sold, the difference with the minimum cost (c-20) is given to a NGO, and 
they must choose which NGO will benefit from the donation in a list of four NGOs: 
“Emmaüs”, the “Red Cross”, “Secours populaire” are social NGOs helping poor or homeless 
people, and “Fonds ADIE” is a NGO that sustains entrepreneurship via micro-credit.
7 In this 
                                                 
6 It has been shown in the literature that four firms on the market are close to perfect competition as the 
introduction of additional firms does not affect the degree of competition on the market (see for example Krause 
et al. 2004). 
7 All these NGOs are well-known by the French population, except “Fonds ADIE” but all participants received 
details about actions of each NGO. 4 
design, there are neither fixed costs of production nor limited capacities of production: sellers 
produce the exact number of units sold.
8  All prices are then posted simultaneously and 
revealed to customers. It is public information that production costs over the minimum cost 
can generate a donation to one of the four NGO, but only sellers know the exact cost and the 
NGO. Sellers cannot be identified and tracked across periods, as offers appear on the screen in 
a random order at each period. Last, buyers receive a fixed endowment, and must purchase at 
least four units of the virtual good.
9 They can buy all units to a single or several sellers. After 
all buyers made their choice, individual payoffs are privately provided, and a new period 
starts automatically. 
The payoff functions of all agents (sellers, buyers and NGOs) are common knowledge. At 
each period, the payoffs πj of a seller j are computed as follows: 
  ( ) , 1,2,...,8 jj j j j Ep c q j       
With qj is the number of units sold by seller j in the period. A fixed payment of Ej=50 
ECU has been added to limit disparities in payments between sellers and customers, and to 
reach a minimum average gain for those participants who are assigned to the role of sellers. 
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where djk is a dummy variable that equals 1 if seller j chooses NGO k as beneficiary, and 0 
otherwise. 
In this experimental design, the donation associated to each unit sold is not observed. It is a 
credence attribute. From buyers’ point of view, products are differentiated according to the 
expected donation that each unit purchased can generate. This expected donation is a measure 
of the ethical quality of the product. As emphasised in Section 2, we do not induce 
preferences over quality, which makes a difference with the experimental designs previously 
used in the literature Cason and Gangadharan 2002. The buyers’ valuation of quality is the 
utility associated to positive donations, i.e. to purchasing goods whose production costs are 
expected to be higher than 20 ECU. This utility depends on buyers’ preferences for donations 
to the NGOs and their expectations regarding the amount of the donation, and not on the 
parameters implemented by the experimentalist through payoff functions. The expected 
                                                 
8 We could have supposed limited production capacities for sellers as it is often assumed in industrial 
organization theory. However, this would raise methodological issues regarding the interpretation of the results. 
If buyers knew that production capacities were limited, they would make their choice more quickly. Hence, some 
of them would certainly not have enough time to carefully choose their preferred option and this would generate 
noise. To obtain more reliable results, we therefore assume that sellers can always satisfy the demand.  
9 As we did not want to formally induce customers’ preferences in their payoff function as it can be the case in 
posted offer market games, we force customers to buy a minimal number of units (this framework is also used in 
Rode et al. 2008). This corresponds for instance to food choices or any goods that individuals have to purchase 
on a regular basis. 5 
donation/quality is a function of the information set of the buyer. The various treatments 
manipulate the structure of this information set. 
2.2.Main research treatments 
The three other treatments have been designed in order to analyze the effect of labels and 
various label regulations on the market, in comparison with the control treatment. There are 
two types of label regulations that differ by requirements on labelling: a certification delivered 
by an independent third-party; cheap-talk signalling with random monitoring. Regulation by a 
third-party corresponds to official certifications as ISO norms or labels administered by 
independent certifying agencies with strict criteria of attribution such as Max Havelaar. 
Cheap-talk signalling corresponds to unregulated company labels, usually called “logo”, or to 
advertising campaigns about a company’s social investments. Although there is no 
certification agency that controls whether the company has any substantiation for its claims, 
media, activist groups or consumer associations can and sometimes do assume this role. A 
key difference with third-party certification is that this monitoring activity corresponds to a 
random probability that unsubstantiated claims be detected.
10 In addition, the consequences of 
detection differ according to whether its reputation is at stake or not. We therefore run one 
treatment with third-party certification, one treatment with cheap-talk signalling without 
reputation and one treatment with market regulation with cheap-talk signalling reputation. 
In the third-party certification treatment (TP treatment), sellers can choose to post a label 
together with the price when they choose their production cost. They can post the label only if 
their production cost is higher than or equal to 25 ECU. The label is perfect, as it indicates 
that sellers have a production cost higher than or equal to 25 with probability one. This is 
common knowledge for all participants in the session. 
The cheap-talk signalling with random monitoring treatment (RM treatment) is similar to 
the TP treatment, except that the label has not the same features. The label is not certified, 
since sellers with a production cost lower than 25 ECU can also post a label with their offer. 
However, those sellers who post a labelled offer but have chosen a production cost lower than 
25 ECU have a probability equal to 1/3 to be detected as not fulfilling the minimum quality 
standard of 25 ECU. In this case, the offer appears on buyers’ screens with the mention “Has 
the label but the production cost is lower than 25 ECU”. The probability of detection is 
independently and identically distributed across sellers. 
The cheap-talk signalling with random monitoring and reputation treatment (RMR 
treatment) is identical to the RM treatment, except that sellers can be tracked across periods. 
Each seller is identified by a letter (from A to H) that is the same for the whole game.  
2.3.Elicitation of social preferences 
Before subjects participate in the market game, they all play in a modified version of the 
dictator game, which is conducted to elicit their social preferences, and more precisely their 
altruism. Each participant receives an endowment of 50 ECU. Then, they have to decide how 
much they want to give to one of the NGO presented above (“Emmaus”, “Red Cross”, 
“Secours populaire” and “Fonds ADIE”). They can give between 0 and 50 ECU, and keep the 
remaining sum. It is common knowledge that all decisions are anonymous, and that NGOs 
will really receive the donations. In addition, the participants do not know that they are going 
to play the market game. 
2.4.Procedures 
                                                 
10 Certification agencies also use random monitoring procedures, but only when the company has been certified 
for the first time. We here abstract from this consideration. 6 
All sessions have been conducted at the University La Sorbonne in Paris. The design was 
computerized with the software “Regate” (Fischbacher 2007). The recruitment was made with 
the software “ORSEE” (Greiner 2004). We organized 19 sessions, with 20 participants in 
each session. In total, 380 subjects participated in the experiment: 40 subjects in the control 
treatment, 120 subjects in the third-party certification treatment, 120 subjects in the random 
monitoring treatment and 100 subjects in the reputation treatment.
11 
For payment, subjects received the sum of their payment in the modified dictator game, in 
the market game and a show-up fee equal to 4€. In the market game, one period out of the 20 
periods was randomly drawn at the end of the session. Hence, payments were determined at 
the end of the sessions. They were received in a separated room to preserve confidentiality. 
Each session lasted between 120 and 140 minutes and participants received on average 
23.20€. After the sessions, we made the donations online and sent back to participants a proof 
of payment. 
 
3.  Label regulations and the emergence of a separating equilibrium 
3.1. Label regulation with third-party certification 
In the third-party certification treatment, customers can choose to buy labeled or non-
labeled goods when they are offered on the market. We first determine whether a demand for 
goods with high ethical quality exists, i.e., a demand for labelled goods. Figure 1 presents 
market shares of sellers who have a label and shares of labelled goods exchanged on the 
market by period in the TP treatment. 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of market shares of labeled sellers and goods in the TP treatment 
The figure shows that there exists a positive demand for labelled goods when labels are 
certified by a third-party. On average, 31% (28.4% for periods 6 to 20) of exchanged goods 
are labeled goods. The share of sellers with the label is on average 48.1% (45.3% for periods 
6 to 20). These results are summarized in Result 1. 
Result 1. In case of a label regulation certified by a third-party, a demand for goods with a 
high ethical quality exists. The share of sellers offering labeled goods is higher than the share 
of labeled goods exchanged on the market. 
We study now the market prices. We analyze the average price of goods in the third-party 
certification treatment and in the control treatment. The average price is a weighted average: it 
                                                 













is equal to the sum of all prices times the number of goods sold at each price divided by the 
total number of goods sold on the market at the current period. Figure 2 presents the evolution 
by period of the average price of goods on the market in the C and TP treatments. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the average price on the market in the C and TP treatments 
We observe that the market is stabilized after period 5. So, we make the analysis for data 
from period 6 to period 20. From period 6 to period 20, the average price is 22.54 in the 
control treatment. In the third-party certification treatment, the average price of non-labeled 
goods is 21.31 and the average price of labeled goods is 27.39. Two types of good are 
exchanged on the market in the TP treatment and each type of goods is exchanged at a 
significantly different price (Wilcoxon signed-rank test with one independent observation per 
session that is the average price over periods from periods 6 to 20: z=2.201, p=0.028). 
Result 2. . In case of a label regulation certified by a third-party, both non-labeled and 
labeled goods are exchanged on the market and these two types of goods are sold at different 
prices. 
3.2. Cheap-talk signalling with random monitoring 
When the label regulation is not certified by a third-party, the truthfulness of the label is 
diminished. Sellers can receive a label although they do not comply with the conditions to 
receive the label. Figure 3 presents market shares of sellers who have a label and shares of 


























































Figure 3. Evolution of market shares of labeled sellers and goods in the RM and RMR 
treatments 
Regarding market shares, in total, 93.4% (92.7% for periods 6 to 20) of exchanged goods 
are labeled goods in the RM treatment. When reputation of sellers is introduced, 64.1% 
(64.9% for periods 6 to 20) of exchanged goods are labeled goods. In the RMR treatment, the 
share of sellers with the label is on average 86.4% (87% for periods 6 to 20). Figure 4 
presents the evolution of prices of both labeled and non-labeled goods in the RM and RMR 
treatments. 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of the average price on the market in the RM and RMR treatments 
In the RM treatment, the average price of the non-labeled good is not significantly 
different from the average price of the labeled good (Wilcoxon signed-rank test with one 
independent observation per session: z=0.105, p=0.917). Results are different when reputation 
of firms exists. In this case, the average price of labeled goods is significantly higher than the 
average price of non-labeled goods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test with one independent 
observation per session: z=2.023, p=0.043). Result 3 summarizes the results we just 
described. 
Result 3. In case of a label regulation by the market, only labeled goods are offered on the 
market when sellers have no reputation. When reputation of sellers is introduced, both labeled 
and non-labeled goods are offered at different prices. Average prices of labeled goods are 
significantly lower in the RMR treatment than in the TP treatment. 
 
4.  Label regulations and efficiency 
Efficiency gains are observed when there is a label regulation instead of no regulation if 
customers with different social preferences buy goods maximizing their utility, i.e., when both 
labeled and non-labeled goods are offered on the market, sellers’ profits are unchanged or 
reduced and donations to NGOs are increased. We run linear regressions testing the 
significance of differences in payoffs of all agents per period from period 6 to period 20, i.e., 
sellers’ profits, customers’ payoffs and donations to NGOs, in the TP, RM and RMR 
treatments in comparison to the C treatment. We control for a time trend. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clusters in sellers when the dependant variable is sellers’ profits or donations to 
NGOs and for clusters in customers when the dependant variable is customers’ payoffs. Table 












































Dependant variable: Payoffs 







C  Treatment  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
TP  Treatment  -3.040 -5.423 6.731*** 
  (2.533) (4.648) (1.797) 
RM Treatment  5.217*  -5.045  0.713 
  (2.880) (4.148) (1.591) 
RMR Treatment  -2.296  1.483  -0.178 
  (2.566) (3.454) (1.311) 
Constant 16.356***  152.344***  4.952*** 
  (2.445) (3.093) (1.608) 
Observations  2280 3420 2280 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
R-squared  0.050 0.012 0.056 
Table 1. Linear regression explaining payoffs between treatments 
Result 4 and 5 summarize efficiency gains in the various treatments. 
Result 4. In case of a label regulation certified by a third-party, efficiency gains are 
obtained in comparison to a situation without any regulation: customers buy goods that 
maximize their utility, average sellers’ premiums are unchanged and average donations are 
increased. 
Result 5. In case of a market label regulation, no efficiency gains are observed when there 
is no sellers’ reputation in comparison to a situation without any regulation: only one type of 
goods is offered on the market, sellers make additional profits and donations are not higher. 
When sellers’ reputation is introduced, efficiency gains are observed in comparison to a 
situation without any regulation but they are lower than in comparison to a situation with a 
label regulation certified by a third-party. 
The market game is a zero-sum game in the sense that the total amount of wealth is 
identical in all sessions in all treatments. According to our framework, production costs are 
different depending on the number of goods sold on the market. In table 2, we report 
variations of payoffs of sellers, customers, NGOs and of production costs when a label 
regulation is introduced in comparison to a situation with no label regulation. 
  C Treatment  TP Treatment  RM Treatment  RMR Treatment 
Profits -  -24,32  +41,73  -18,37 
Customers’ gains  -  -65,08  -60,54  +17,79 
Donations -  +53,84  +5,70  -1,43 
Production costs  -  +35,56  +13,11  +2,00 
Number of sold goods  -  +1,78  +0,66  +0,10 
Table 2. Transfers of sum of payoffs per period per treatment relatively to the C treatment 
We observe that when a label certified by a third-party is introduced, customers and sellers 
support a decrease of their payoffs to increase payoffs of NGOs. In case of the 
implementation of a label market regulation, when sellers have no reputation, only customers 
support losses, mainly to increase sellers’ profits. NGOs only marginally benefit from the 
decrease of customers’ payoffs. When there is a reputation of sellers, transfers are made from 
sellers to customers. Donations to NGOs are decreased but of a thin amount. 10 
We observe significantly higher sellers’ profits in the RM treatment than in the C 
treatment. This result cannot be explained by the informational rent sellers may benefit from 
in the RM treatment as the information asymmetry is as strong in the RM treatment, as in the 
C treatment. Instead, we suggest that we observe a halo effect. The halo effect is originally 
defined by Edward Thorndike as “a problem that arises in data collection when there is carry-
over from one judgment to another” (Thorndike 1920).
12 In our framework, the halo effect is a 
perception error of customers about sellers’ social preferences and about the ethical quality of 
goods inferred from prices due to the implementation of a label regulation where the ethical 
quality of goods is emphasized. In the RM treatment, it is made prominent for customers via 
the explanation of the label that sellers may choose production costs higher than the minimum 
to induce donations to NGOs through their sales. In the C treatment, customers know that 
sellers may make donations to NGOs through their sales but it is less prominent than in the 
RM treatment as labels cannot be used. Customers appear to believe more in sellers’ social 
preferences when the ethical quality of goods is emphasized although the way it is 
emphasized cannot be truthful. Therefore, a label market regulation without firms’ reputation 
should be avoided to preserve customers’ well-being. Result 6 summarizes these results. 
Result 6. In case of label market regulation without sellers’ reputation, customers are 
subject to a halo effect that decreases their well-being. 
 
5.  Individual social preferences and market choices 
We proxy subjects’ social preferences by the amount subjects give to NGOs in the 
modified dictator game. Social preferences of subjects are increased all the more as the 
amount given to NGOs are increased. We observe heterogeneity in subjects’ social 
preferences. This is true for sellers as well as for customers. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
comparing distributions of donations between all treatments are not significant neither for 
sellers nor for customers. 
Table 3 presents results of linear regressions explaining sellers’ choices of production costs 
in each treatment. Independent variables are donations to NGOs in the first part of the 
experiment, gender, age and we control for a time trend. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clusters in sellers. 
Dependant variable: Sellers’ production costs    
  C Treatment  TP Treatment  RM Treatment  RMR Treatment 
Periods  -0.014  -0.051**  -0.026     -0.026    
  (0.076)  (0.026)  (0.030)      (0.023)     
Donation in first part  0.037  0.067***  0.061**   0.040** 
  (0.047)  (0.018)   (0.030)       (0.018)      
Gender  0.743  0.445  -0.797     0.236    
  (1.229)  (0.665)  (0.681)      (0.489)      
Age 0.022  0.089  0.123**  0.086** 
  (0.033)  (0.064)  (0.046)       (0.040)      
Constant  20.425***  20.092***  18.625***   19.125***    
  (2.448)  (1.655)  (1.271)      (1.090)     
Observations   240  720  720  600 
Prob > F  0.853  0.000  0.013  0.026 
R-squared   0.014  0.088  0.136  0.052 
Table 3. Linear regressions explaining sellers’ production costs 
                                                 
12 Thorndike 1920 was the first empirical study supporting the halo effect. The application was the rating of 
employees. 11 
Regression coefficients lead to result 7. 
Result 7. The production cost chosen by sellers in the market game increase as their social 
preferences increase when a label regulation is implemented. 
We run linear regressions to study whether decisions of customers to buy labeled goods is 
driven by their social preferences. The explaining variable is the proportion of labeled goods 
each customer buys in a period. We restrict our analysis to periods 6 to 20. 
Dependant variable: Proportion of labeled goods bought by customer 
  TP Treatment  RM Treatment  RMR Treatment 
Periods  -0.002  -0.005**  0.005     
  (0.003)  (0.002)      (0.003)      
Donation in first part  0.015***    0.002     0.012*** 
  (0.003)       (0.001)       (0.004)      
Gender  0.097     -0.036     -0.100     
  (0.072)       (0.045)      (0.109)     
Age  0.012***     -0.001     0.016*** 
  (0.003)       (0.002)      (0.006)      
Constant   -0.342***  0.947***  0.083    
  (0.116)      (0.061)      (0.187)      
Observations    540 540 540 
Prob > F  0.000  0.034  0.001 
R-squared    0.420 0.017 0.186 
Table 4. Linear regression explaining the proportion of labeled goods bought by customers 
Result 8 summarizes the relation between customers’ social preferences and customers’ 
purchases of labeled goods. 
Result 8. The proportion of labeled goods bought by customers depends positively on 
customers’ social preferences only when the implemented label is truthful, i.e., only in the TP 
and RMR treatments. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The experiment we run allowed us to precisely analyze the consequences of an 
implementation of different types of labels on both the supply and the demand sides. Our 
experiment is among the first empirical studies identifying how corporate and consumer 
social responsibilities influence the market. Without implementing consumers’ preferences 
through their payoff function, we find that a demand for ethical goods exists although they are 
sold at higher prices than non-ethical goods. A label regulation with a third-party certification 
leads to efficiency gains in comparison to a situation with no labeling possibility for firms. In 
case of a market regulation, when firms have a reputation, both non-labeled and labeled goods 
are sold on the market at different prices but efficiency gains are not observed as donations to 
NGOs are equivalent to donations when there is no label regulation. As expected, when firms 
have no reputation, the market label regulation does not lead to a separating equilibrium. 
However, data show that consumers support a halo effect that leads to a decrease of their 
well-being but to an increase of firms’ profits. Indeed, the data suggest that consumers 
misperceive the ethical quality of goods inferred from prices because the ethical quality of 
goods is emphasized through the label regulation. Regarding the influence of social 
preferences on both firms’ and consumers’ behavior, we observe that sellers’ choice of 
production costs increases with their social preferences when any label is implemented and 
customers’ decision to buy labeled goods increases with their social preferences only when 
the label is credible enough, i.e., in the third-party certification and the reputation treatments. 12 
In terms of political recommendations, our data suggest that a label market regulation 
should be avoided when firms have no reputation as consumers’ well-being is reduced. 
Besides, a label market regulation with firms’ reputation does not lead to efficiency gains. In 
order to allow consumers who positively value the ethical quality of goods to express their 
social preferences in their buying decisions and to increase social aspects of the society, the 
only label regulation is a regulation with a third-party certification. Although certification fees 
must be supported, this is the only way of increasing efficiency. 
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